Advocacy

CEEC Hosts Panel of Foreign Policy Rock Stars

The Central and East European Coalition (CEEC) hosted a policy seminar on September 27th titled, Russia on NATO’s Doorstep:  the West’s Response to the Kremlin’s Wargames, to examine the aftermath of Russia’s Zapad 2017 military exercises.  The panel of experts consisted of Ambassador Kurt Volker, Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations; Dr. Stephen Blank, American Foreign Policy Council Senior Fellow for Russia; Ambassador Eitvydas Bajarunas, Ambassador-at-Large for Hybrid Threats, Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Alex Tiersky, Global Security and Political-Military Affairs Advisor, U.S. Helsinki Commission.  The discussion was moderated by CEEC colleague, Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli of the Georgian Association in the U.S.  Although analysis of the exercise will be ongoing for weeks, they offered their perspectives from their respective backgrounds and the information available so far.

Ambassador Volker started off by acknowledging the CEEC’s important role in promoting NATO enlargement.  He encouraged the coalition to continue its work to remind Congress and policymakers that these countries matter and constituents of heritage from the region care about U.S. policy affecting it.  He then framed Zapad in a context of Russia on a trajectory that is still playing out.  In the 1990s, Russia was trying to find its place in Europe.  The Soviet Union had agreed to the fundamental principles of European security and cooperation outlined in the Helsinki Accords and seemed inclined to engage

CEEC Kurt and hats

EANC Washington, DC Director Karin Shuey presents a token of appreciation on behalf of the CEEC to Ambassador Volker.  Photo courtesy of JBANC.

with Europe on those terms.  Then Putin came to power and Russia’s policies began to contradict democratic values, taking an imperialistic view over all Russian speakers wherever they lived.  Europe rejected him and concern over Russian expansionism set in.

Volker saw Zapad 2017 in this context as a vehicle for the Kremlin to demonstrate to its neighbors, domestic population, and to western Europe, recent improvements in the Russian military’s capabilities, doctrine and funding.  At the same time, there was no indication of intent to expand geographically.  Sanctions over Russia’s actions in Ukraine and increased activity in NATO have perhaps had an impact on Putin’s ambitions.  Since the invasion, Ukraine has elected a government that is the opposite of his presumed goal – it is unified, anti-Russian, and westward-looking.  Keeping the occupied territory in eastern Ukraine is coming at great cost to the Kremlin.  Volker sees his task as bolstering Ukrainian will to facilitate the removal of Russian troops and reestablish sovereignty, while creating the right conditions for the Kremlin to see the withdrawal of troops as in its own interests.

Dr. Blank identified the need for NATO to understand the threat before it can act effectively in consensus.   Russia sees itself at war with the West even if Europe doesn’t want to admit it.  Democratic transatlantic integration threatens Putin, who doesn’t acknowledge the post-Cold War settlement or sovereignty of any eastern European state.  He has no hesitation to exploit Western vulnerabilities, whether through corruption, access to energy resources, or ethnic and religious tensions.  His objective is to fracture Western cohesion.  Blank also noted that while strong transatlantic ties may threaten Putin, they actually work in the interests of Russia’s population and well-being as a nation.

Blank went on to assess the region’s military situation.  He emphasized the importance of enhanced cooperation between NATO and its Nordic partners, specifically Sweden and Finland, to fill in gaps in air and naval capabilities.  Increased defense spending, better freedom of movement for deploying troops, and joint training and exercises in the theater also play key roles in deterrence.  On a more concerning note, while there is an ongoing debate among allies on the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe, Russia has multiple new nuclear procurement programs and has violated every arms treaty except New START with no repercussions.

CEEC panel 2017

Panel line-up from right:  Ambassador Volker, Ambassador Bajarunas, Dr. Blank, Mr. Tiersky, and moderator Dr. Tsereteli.

Mr. Tiersky was the only U.S. official invited by the Belarusian government to take part in the observer events for the exercise.  The Belarusian Ministry of Defense held a briefing of the scenario and troops involved, characterizing it as completely defensive and reporting that all Russian forces and equipment would leave upon completion of the training.  Tiersky reported that the view given to the observers was too limited to tell the actual extent of the maneuvers.  Assessments are still in progress and there was no consensus yet on what really took place.  The NATO commander’s office issued preliminary findings that the exercise was bigger than reported beforehand but there were no reports of the extensive alarming pre-exercise speculation coming true.  Tiersky noted that Belarus should be commended for offering some degree of transparency, indicating possible signs of new openness to the West, or perhaps a statement of sovereignty.  It was not, however, the full level of transparency that Western analysts had hoped for.

Tiersky identified a larger problem, in that Russia is failing to abide by multiple treaties.  They tend to avoid full reporting of their military training by conducting short-notice, so-called snap exercises, which don’t require the same level of reporting as scheduled exercises.  Helsinki Commission members need to revitalize their discussion on modernizing the Vienna Document to account for snap exercises and address the censure the Russian delegation faces on a regular basis.

Ambassador Bajarunas shared his views on the allies’ tendency to overemphasize the military aspects of the threat from the Kremlin, recommending continued investment in defense against both conventional and unconventional tactics.  He expressed the need for U.S. presence in the region with both military and government representation to cement resilience against the asymmetric threat.  Internal reforms are also necessary in many countries to address media literacy, corruption, intelligence sharing and other weak points that Putin can exploit.

In the end, the panel agreed that the principles of the Helsinki Accords should be upheld and allies should be clear that NATO’s mission is purely defensive.  Regardless of the final assessments on the meaning of this Zapad, the transatlantic community needs to reinforce for future generations the importance of intellectual, moral, economic, military and political unity for the health and well-being of all nations.  In the U.S., the CEEC can continue to advocate for policy that promotes democratic ideals and security for central and eastern Europe and beyond.

The CEEC was established in 1994 to coordinate the efforts of ethnic organizations whose members continue to maintain strong cultural, economic, and political ties to the countries of central and eastern Europe.  It represents Americans of Armenian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Georgian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, and Ukrainian descent.  Its member organizations, including the Estonian American National Council, cooperate in calling attention to issues of mutual concern, especially regarding United States policy toward Central and East Europe.  Please see ceecoalition.us for more information.

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Advocacy

Estonian Experts Weigh in on Transatlantic Policy

Two major think tank events in Washington recently featured Estonian speakers on topics including reforming NATO for the 21st century, security challenges of the information age, defending NATO’s frontiers, and state sponsors of disinformation.  The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) held its annual two-day conference on transatlantic security September 21-22, where Estonian Defense Minister Jüri Luik, Defense League commander Major General Meelis Kiili, and strategic communications expert Urve Eslas were among the top-level lineup of presenters and panelists.  The following week, the Atlantic Council held the first transatlantic forum on strategic communications to examine the influence of agents of destabilizing disinformation.  Former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves was a major contributor to that discussion.

At the CEPA forum, Minister Luik tackled what he considered the misconception that the Baltics are indefensible.  He deemed Estonia and its allies capable of creating an effective deterrent to conventional attack.  He cited the need for all NATO allies to overcome their political hurdles and meet or exceed the 2% benchmark for defense spending to further bolster the alliance’s deterrent posture.  He also stressed the role of the U.S. in coordination with the EU,

CEPA gallery Luik

Defense Minister Jüri Luik speaking at CEPA Forum 2017 (Photo courtesy of CEPA)

stating that, “nothing can replace the U.S. … as the guarantor of security in Europe.”  He expressed high regard for the robust signals of support the U.S. has consistently sent on political and practical levels, calling out European Deterrence Initiative funding as a strong symbol of U.S. commitment to European security.

General Kiili shared his thoughts based on Estonia’s experience under 50 years of Kremlin-led Soviet occupation and the psychological aspects of Russia’s multi-layered strategies.  He called the current state of affairs a clash between democratic order and oligarchic order, and named education on the Kremlin’s efforts to establish moral equivalency between their actions and those of the West as the highest priority for rendering them ineffective.  He characterized Estonia’s Defense League as an opportunity for every citizen to exercise their obligation and right to participate in the defense of their country.

Ms. Eslas explained how information attacks have been a part of digital warfare since 2015 and are aimed at damaging the three key pillars of liberal democracy, namely freedom of speech, free and fair elections, and rule of law.  One focus of countermeasures should be to strengthen those pillars.  She cited evidence of Internet bots (software applications that run repetitive tasks, like retweeting targeted messages) and their use in propagating disinformation, and made the point that limiting bots does not amount to restricting free speech for actual people.  She then outlined the challenge of overcoming the Kremlin’s propaganda campaign.  If Russian policy assumes that NATO is a threat and that all media is propaganda, then any attempt to counter those assumptions becomes fodder for more propaganda and justifies the false narratives.  We can understand disinformation in three parts:  sender, receiver and message.  While much is known about the senders and the messages, we need better understanding of the receivers in order to neutralize propaganda’s effectiveness.

The Atlantic Council event further highlighted the growing preponderance of weaponized fake news, politicized corruption, digital magnification of disinformation, and unattributed advertisements.  It also pointed out that the West has created the conditions for these tactics to thrive by permitting the creation of anonymous shell corporations for money laundering, allowing special interests to operate without

AC STRATCOM Ilves photo

Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves (center) discusses Russian disinformation tactics, joined by Edward Lucas (left) and Peter Pomerantsev.

transparency, and holding online advertising to lesser standards than advertising in conventional media.  Sunlight and transparency were identified as the enemies of these practices and there was consensus that legislation requiring greater transparency is needed in all aspects of the problem.

President Ilves offered his observations on the Kremlin’s strategies.  He cited as his main concerns:  doxing (the practice of publishing private information on individuals or organizations, typically with malicious intent), Twitterbots magnifying false stories (as mentioned above), psychological manipulation, non-attributed ads on social media, and using metadata to target ads to sway opinion.  He noted that social media platforms have become more popular sources of news than traditional outlets, which adds to our vulnerability.  There has been a noticeable shift since 2014 – earlier, fake news was more easily identified and refuted or ignored by trusted news sources.  In recent years, even reliable outlets and print media publishers have started giving more attention to disinformation in the name of balanced reporting, while in fact they are actually skewing the picture in the favor of fake news.  When even outrageous lies get equal time with fact-based reporting, many consumers of the information draw the false conclusion that the truth is somewhere in the middle instead of accepting the factual reports.

President Ilves also brought up the Gerasimov doctrine – a 2013 article by Russia’s chief of the General Staff at the time that outlined the use of non-military tactics not just to augment the traditional tools of war, but as the preferred means to win the war.  Ilves warned against the danger of focusing too much on just fake news because this doctrine includes a broad spectrum of ways to manipulate and sow discord.  There is no reciprocal response.  Western nations can limit visas, enact laws against money laundering, investigate suspicious deaths, and watch and document how these tools are used but no collective defense has yet been developed.

The presence of Estonian representatives at both of these events shows that the tiny nation’s expertise is highly valued in NATO and the transatlantic partnership.  Estonia’s unique historical experience with threats from the east has ingrained in its population a deep understanding that its NATO and EU allies lack.  It was clear among both audiences and the other speakers that the Estonians’ voices on these matters were respected, and that they will be invited back on a regular basis as understanding of the threat from the Kremlin evolves.

For summaries and video of the CEPA and Atlantic Council events, please see www.cepaforum.org and www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/webcasts/stratcom-dc.  For more information on the Gerasimov doctrine, please look for Molly McKew’s Politico article on the topic.

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Advocacy

EANC supports Global Magnitsky Act

eanc-logo-imageEANC joined a coalition of 23 groups concerned with human rights in signing an open letter to Secretary of State Tillerson and Secretary of the Treasury Mnuchin stressing the importance of implementation and enforcement of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.  Global Magnitsky was signed into law in December 2016.  It authorizes the President to imposed financial sanctions and visa restrictions on foreign citizens who engage in certain human rights violations and acts of corruption.  The Departments of State and Treasury hold primary responsibility for enforcing the sanctions.

The letter was drafted and coordinated by Human Rights First (HRF), a non-profit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in New York, Washington D.C., Houston, and Los Angeles.  They also vetted and submitted in conjunction with the letter 15 case files for review under the act.  The HRF press release is available on their website at humanrightsfirst.org under blogs and press releases for September 13th (titled NGOs Identify Human Rights Abusers…).  The full letter and case summaries are also linked from the press release.

EANC advocated for Global Magnitsky and fully supports its provisions and enforcement.  The Estonian parliament unanimously passed a similar law, also in December 2016.  Several European countries, Canada, the U.K. and the European Parliament have also passed similar legislation.

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Advocacy

A Perspective on Zapad 2017

As Russia’s quadrennial military exercise Zapad gets underway, there’s no shortage of analysis and commentary on what to expect.  Scheduled to start on September 14th and run for seven days, Zapad 2017 has been a hot topic among think tanks, NGOs, Russia experts, military experts, and other interested parties for the last several months.  The most comprehensive source of information may be the Center for European Policy Analysis and its dedicated website, Road to Zapad 2017 (infowar.cepa.org/the-road-to-zapad-2017).  That said, countless other sources, including the Atlantic Council, Baltic Times, Military Times, National Interest, Foreign Policy, RFE/RL, and German Marshall Fund, have contributed to varying degrees on the topic.

The main question posed in the coverage has been about whether or not the West should be worried.  Although fictitious adversarial states were created for the exercise, the scenario has been reported as a simulation of a NATO attack on Belarus, with Russia coming to its neighbor’s aid in defending the attack.  There is general consensus that the number of troops Russia is sending exceeds that of past Zapads and that Russia is not meeting the reporting requirements laid out in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Vienna Document.  Russia and Belarus have put the number at less than 13,000 – the level at which the Vienna Document mandates OSCE inspections –  while previous exercises have approached the 100,000-troop mark.

The worst-case outcome would be Russia’s use of the exercise as a cover for stationing permanent troops or equipment in Belarus, an intention they have demonstrated in past large-scale exercises, as in Ukraine in 2014 and Georgia in 2008.  Previous Zapad exercises have simulated invasion of the Baltic states, a nuclear strike on Warsaw, and bombing runs against Sweden, but did not end in violation of any nation’s sovereignty.  While Belarus has invited military observers from seven countries – Ukraine, Poland, Sweden, Norway and the three Baltic nations – to take part in specific visitors’ days, this, too falls short of OSCE transparency measures.

Reuters Zapad graphic

Graphic of Russian and Belarusian participation as reported by the Russian Ministry of Defense.  Source: Reuters.

Russia is downplaying the scale of Zapad, accusing the West of overreacting and risking stability in Europe with its concurrent buildup of NATO forces in the region.  They characterize the event as practicing strictly defensive maneuvers and that they pose a threat to no one.  Meanwhile, educated viewpoints in the West criticize the scenario as completely unrealistic and place responsibility for any instability along Russia’s borders squarely in the hands of the Kremlin.

The Estonian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has indicated distrust of the numbers reported by Moscow based on past experience with other Russian exercises and has been closely monitoring preparations for this one.  According to a news article on the MoD website, Minister Jüri Luik is “…hoping to see greater transparency and observance of international agreements both prior to and during the exercise” (see kaitseministeerium.ee/en/news for 28.08.2017).  Estonian representatives will take part in the observer program 16-20 September and Estonia’s defense attaché will attend a program for all defense attachés accredited to Moscow at the Luga training ground, about 90 miles south of St. Petersburg, 18-19 September.

An interested party could spend days trying to digest all the information available on different aspects of Zapad 2017.  Until the exercise is finished and its aftermath is clear later in September, much of what has been written so far will remain speculation.  While there are indications that troop movements and naval deployments exceed what Russia and Belarus have reported, and it seems likely that far more than 13,000 soldiers will be mobilized, the endgame will only be revealed once the dust settles.  Analysis and commentary at that point will undoubtedly be much more consequential.

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Advocacy

Black Ribbon Day Observance in DC

BRD 2017 VoC group photo

The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation (VOCMF) and the Joint Baltic American National Committee (JBANC) held their annual observance of Black Ribbon Day on August 23rd at the Victims of Communism Memorial in Washington, DC.  The ceremony recognized the 78th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Ambassadors from Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Latvia made remarks, all stressing the importance of ensuring that totalitarian regimes never again violate the sovereignty of independent nations.  EANC and the embassies of Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland were also represented, along with dozens of participants from other embassies, organizations, and communities, who gathered to remember the victims of the 1939 pact.

For more information, please see the VOCMF blog.

(Photo courtesy of VOCMF.)

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Advocacy

EANC Meets with State Department

Estonian American National Council representatives joined Joint Baltic American National Committee (JBANC) colleagues for a briefing from the Department of State (DoS) Baltic team on Friday, August 11th.  The newly appointed Director of Nordic and Baltic Affairs, Ian Campbell, and desk officers for Latvia, James Lovell, and Lithuania, Carol Werner, shared their insights on policy and current and upcoming events relevant to U.S.-Baltic relationships.

The visit to Estonia by Vice President Mike Pence on July

Aug 2017 State meeting

Participants in the JBANC meeting with the State Department Baltic team.  From left:  Anna Udre, Julia Lazdins, Chris Evans, Karin Shuey, Ausma Tomsevics, Carol Werner, Henry Gaidis, Ian Campbell, Karl Altau, Peter Blumberg. Photo courtesy of JBANC.

30-31 was a main topic of discussion.  Tallinn was his first stop on a European trip that also included Georgia and Montenegro.  He addressed the three Baltic presidents and military troops from Estonia, the U.S., the United Kingdom, and France, serving in the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in Estonia, at the Estonian Defense Forces headquarters in Tallinn.  His remarks reflected the close relationship and keen understanding the Administration holds regarding security challenges in the Baltic region and beyond – a message that got stronger as his trip progressed.  The vice president’s full remarks are posted on the White House Briefing Room Speeches & Remarks page for July 31st.  Our State Department colleagues reported that the he was glad to also discuss a broad range of non-security issues, including Estonia’s EU presidency; energy, economic and financial cooperation; trade and investment; and collaboration on cyber security.  The next opportunity for Baltic leaders to engage with the Administration will likely be at the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Russia was another major topic covered.  The Zapad military exercise in mid-September is of concern to all and will be closely monitored.  While confidence was expressed in the EFP’s ability to keep a close eye on the exercise, there was less certainty in Russia’s reporting of the numbers of troops taking part and what course of events the exercise scenario will take.  Determination of any U.S. response will depend on observation of what actually happens, which EFP troops are well-positioned to do.

The DoS representatives emphasized that not all interaction with Russia is negative.  While the Kremlin is not doing the right thing in basic international relations, most notably in its invasion of Crimea and violation of several nations’ sovereign borders, there are areas where maintaining good relations is important.  Open channels of communication regarding our nuclear arsenals is critical to global security.  Trade and cooperation on space programs are other examples where continuing dialog is good for both sides.  The U.S. should be hard on Russia for violations of international law and other crimes, but it’s a complex relationship and we can’t close doors on all collaboration.

The recently-passed sanctions bill serves as a clear condemnation of Russia’s bad behavior.  Congress is now in the process of negotiating how to implement the sanctions in concert with U.S. allies; what form it will take is still in question.  It’s important to send a deliberate message of censure while understanding the economic partnerships involved.  The U.S. will remain sensitive to those partnerships and will avoid putting them at risk throughout the course of implementation.  One early indication that Russia is taking the sanctions seriously was their expulsion of U.S. diplomats in response to the bill’s passage in Congress.  We can be optimistic that the sanctions will effectively deter future Russian transgressions.

Other priorities discussed included energy security and the campaign against disinformation.  Even with proposed budget cuts to State’s Global Engagement Center, propagating objectivity through public diplomacy will remain a mainstay of the embassies’ missions.   There are multiple funding streams and many levels of approach that will keep combating disinformation a top priority.  Energy independence also remains a major concern and DoS will continue to support a competitive market with access to options so no nation’s energy will be controlled by a single source.

Finally, our DoS colleagues expressed awareness of the importance of the Baltic nations’ centennial celebrations next year.  They are fully confident that each embassy will be involved with programs and events supporting its host nation’s milestone.  The State Department is also looking at options for recognizing 100 years of Baltic independence and will keep us informed as their plans develop.  They clearly share the same concerns for Baltic security that EANC and JBANC are engaged in daily and we appreciate their continued support.

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Advocacy

The Russian Sanctions Bill: Persistence Pays Off (A How-to Guide for Calling Your Representative)

The process of getting this summer’s sanctions bill through Congress and passed into law was a real cliffhanger!  After passing in the Senate almost unanimously in mid-June, then getting delayed and revised in the House and eventually passing there, also almost unanimously, and going back to the Senate for another vote of overwhelming support, H.R.3364 – the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act – went to the President’s desk on July 28th and was signed into law on August 2nd.  Officially the bill also contained new sanctions on Iran and North Korea as well as Russia, but the main focus was clearly the latter. While the bill was in Congress, The Estonian American National Council (EANC), the Joint Baltic American National Committee (JBANC) and our Central and East European Coalition (CEEC) colleagues were tracking its every move, with staffers and volunteers visiting offices in both congressional chambers and encouraging our constituents and supporters through social media and other channels to contact their Members of Congress (MoC) on supporting the bill.

JBANC with flyers

The JBANC team getting ready for a round of meetings with Representatives (photo courtesy of JBANC).

While we can never really know how much influence our work and grassroots efforts had on the passage of this bill, we do believe that complacency is our enemy.  The non-profits representing Americans of CEE descent work daily to make sure the issues affecting that part of the world remain a focus in Congress, and your help is always appreciated!  In particular, we invite you to contact your MoC to voice your interest in Estonian security and an active and engaged US policy for the region.  We in Washington can make the rounds and deliver letters on the Hill all year long, but the biggest impact comes from the MoC’s actual constituents, whose votes matter to those lawmakers we’re visiting. We’d love your help in letting them know that Estonian-Americans support a stable Europe that is a strong US ally, and that Estonia is an important part of this stable Europe.

Now for the how-to part:  Several sources in Washington have told us that phone calls to the MoC office are more effective than written correspondence, so we recommend calls over e-mails, letters or social media posts.  It’s easy to find the contact information using Google. If there’s a group of Estonians living in the same district, you could coordinate to focus on one issue and make your calls all on the same day.  Voicing your issues in person – by visiting your MoC local office or attending town hall meetings – can also get their attention.  Best, of course, is visiting or calling the Washington DC office of the MoC, where it is likely that the staff will be most conversant with foreign policy issues. Even if you are hesitant about visiting a Washington Congressional office on your own, consider letting the EANC or JBANC staff know when you are going to be in town, so that you might be able to visit the Congressional office together. The EANC or JBANC staffer can be an invaluable source of background information and ensure that the key message is delivered clearly to the Congressional staffer. At the same time, you, as a constituent, can open doors to Congressional offices that are not as easy for Washington-based EANC or JBANC personnel to access.

Should you decide that a phone call is the better way for you to reach out, your call will generally be answered by a young staffer whose only job may be answering calls from constituents.  Depending upon the office, there are sometimes staffers who specialize in certain topics such as foreign policy, so it might be good to begin by asking for the staffer who deals with foreign policy matters. Congressional staffers get a lot of calls daily on many topics and take notes to pass on to the MoC.  Many offices keep a database of calls organized by topic, and your call will likely be added to whatever record-keeping system they use.  Before you make your call, it’s a good idea to think about what you want to say. While you do not want to sound too scripted, remember that the staffers are busy, and will appreciate your getting to the point fairly quickly.  Still, personal stories showing why an issue is important to you are especially memorable and effective; just make sure you’re respectful as you share your thoughts.  Remember, it’s their job to listen to you and learn what you think is important. It is fine to express a general sentiment that you value the support of the MoC for issues that help ensure the support of the US for its Estonian ally. But if there is a particular piece of legislation that is being discussed, make sure that you mention your support (or, if necessary, disapproval) of that particular legislation. Then, it certainly helps to know the name or number of the bill in question, before you call.

For ideas on issues to bring up with your MoC, a list of current legislation and other high-priority topics is available at ceecoaltion.us.  Details for all of the bills listed are available at the Congress.gov website.  If you contact your Representative on a House bill, it’s always a good idea to also ask them to join the House Baltic Caucus, or express thanks if they’re already a member.  You can check to see if your Representative is already a member at housebalticcaucus.webs.com.

EANC will continue to support legislation that addresses European security policy pertinent to Estonia and we’ll facilitate efforts by our members and constituents to do the same.  Our activities in Washington will continue to ensure that the administration and lawmakers are aware of issues important to Estonian Americans, and we hope you’ll join us in sharing our message!

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